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Some of Wittgenstein’s early remarks on the 
connection between logic and the world leave a highly anti-
conventionalist impression. For example, in the Tractatus, 
he says that the world is “in logical space” (TLP 1.13) and 
that logic “pervades the world” (TLP 5.61). At a first glance, 
this seems to imply that the rules of logic are determined 
by the way the world is. And this, in turn, seems to be 
something that is not dependent on convention. Consider, 
for example, a passage from the Notebooks 1914-16, 
where Wittgenstein says: 
And it keeps on forcing itself upon us that there is 
some simple indivisible, an element of being, in brief a 
thing … And it appears as if that were identical with the 
proposition that the world must be what it is, it must be 
definite. (NB, 62) 
Further statements favouring an anti-
conventionalist interpretation can be found in the 
Tractatus. According to 5.4731, language “prevents every 
logical mistake”, and what makes logic a priori is the fact 
that one “cannot think illogically”. And according to 6.124, 
logic “is not a field in which we express what we wish with 
the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the 
absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself”.  
These passages have lead Ishiguro to the claim 
that there is no trace of conventionalism about the rules of 
logic in the Tractatus (Ishiguro 2001, 129–31). However, 
Ishiguro’s claim does not take into account important 
evidence from the pre-Tractatus writings. The aim of this 
paper is to argue that construction and convention play a 
significant role in the formation of Wittgenstein’s thought. 
Some aspects of these early developments show 
considerable influence on the philosophy of the Tractatus. 
Moreover, the role of construction and convention leads to 
an explanation for some aspects of the Tractarian 
conception of subjectivity.    
 
1. Logic, Ontology, and Construction 
Wittgenstein introduces the issue of construction in 
the context of his theory of tautologies. This theory of 
tautologies has its roots in Wittgenstein’s theory of the bi-
polarity of propositions. According to the theory of bi-
polarity, a meaningful proposition must be able to be true 
or false (NB, 94). The “poles” of the proposition, 
symbolized by “a” and “b” in Wittgenstein’s notation, 
correspond to the case of the truth and the case of the 
falsehood of the proposition (NB, 98). In the Notes dictated 
to Moore, Wittgenstein makes use of the theory of the bi-
polarity of meaningful propositions in order to characterize 
tautologies. Tautologies are propositions that do not have 
two poles (NB, 113). In a letter to Russell of 1913, 
Wittgenstein analyses the nature of propositions of logic 
with the help of this conception of tautologies:  
It is the peculiar (and most important) 
characteristic of non-logical propositions, that their truth 
cannot be seen in the propositional sign itself. (…) But the 
propositions of logic – and they alone – have the property 
of expressing their truth or falsehood in the very sign itself. 
(…)  
The great question is now: How should a notation 
be constructed, which will make every tautology 
recognizable as a tautology in one and the same way? 
This is the fundamental problem of logic. (NB, 128–9) 
Here, this question is answered with recourse to 
the application of the ab-notation to more complex 
propositions. Already at this place, complex propositions 
are conceived of as truth-functionally dependent on 
elementary sentences. Finally, the Notebook entry of 21 
November 1916 answers the same question in a more 
technical way: 
We now need a clarification of the concept of the 
atomic function and the concept “and so on”. 
The concept “and so on”, symbolized by “….” is 
one of the most important of all and like all the others 
infinitely fundamental. 
For it alone justifies us in constructing logic and 
mathematics “so on” from the fundamental laws and 
primitive signs. (NB, 89) 
On the side of the constitution of the world, the 
idea of construction plays a very similar role. Already in the 
Notebooks, Wittgenstein puts forward a theory of simple 
objects. Although he considers different possibilities for 
what these objects might be like (e.g. minima sensibilia or 
points in visual space; NB, 45; 50; 64), he ultimately is 
confronted with the impossibility of giving convincing 
examples. Therefore, he says:  
If I can imagine a ‘kind of object’ without knowing 
whether there are such objects, then I must have 
constructed their archetype (Urbild) for myself. (NB, 74)  
The notion of object, therefore, is to be seen as the 
result of construction similar to the way rules of logic are 
conceived of as the result of construction. More generally, 
Wittgenstein writes: “we can foresee what we have 
constructed” (NB, 71), which holds for the rules of logical 
notation as well as for the conception of simple objects. 
Construction in logic and construction of the archetype of 
objects, moreover, seem to be tied to each other. For 
example, the question around which much of the early 
sections of the Notebooks turn is: “can we manage without 
simple objects in LOGIC?” (NB, 46). Thus, logic and 
ontology in Wittgenstein’s earliest writings are both to be 
seen as results of construction, and the construction of 
ontology is immediately connected with the construction of 
logic.  
 
2. Construction, Convention, and Adequacy 
Conditions 
The obvious question arising at this point concerns 
the role of convention in construction. In the context of his 
first formulation of the theory of tautologies in the Notes 
dictated to Moore, Wittgenstein says:  
What is unarbitrary about our symbols is not them, 
nor the rules we give; but the fact that, having given certain 
rules, others are fixed = follow logically. (NB, 114)  
He takes this thought up explicitly at TLP 3.342. 
Again, the logical notation shows arbitrary features, 




whereas the consequences of these arbitrary decisions 
follow in a non-arbitrary way. As Wittgenstein says, this 
has to do with the “nature” (“Wesen”) of logical notation. 
This does not mean that construction in logic, in 
Wittgenstein’s view, would be completely unrestricted. 
Already in the Notes dictated to Moore, he says:   
It is true, in a sense, that logical proposition are 
“postulates” – something which we “demand”; for we 
demand a satisfactory notation. (NB, 118).  
This point is repeated in TLP 6.1223. Here, again, 
logical truths are characterised as something we can 
“postulate”, in the sense that we can “postulate” a sufficient 
logical notation. At both places, Wittgenstein clearly takes 
a conventionalist line of thought. However, the role of 
convention in logic at the same time is qualified by 
conditions of adequacy: Convention has to yield a 
“satisfactory” or “sufficient” logical notation. For a 
specification of these adequacy conditions, we have to turn 
to various passages of the Tractatus and the pre-Tractatus 
writings. An important requirement is that a satisfactory 
notation must be constructed in a way that the self-
referential paradoxes cannot occur. According to TLP 
3.333-3.334, logical syntax must preclude the possibility 
that a function can be its own argument. This adequacy 
condition is already part of the early Notes on Logic, where 
Wittgenstein says: 
No proposition can say anything about itself, 
because the symbol of the proposition cannot be contained 
in itself; this must be the basis of the theory of logical 
types. (NB, 107) 
In fact, Wittgenstein sets up a much more 
extravagant catalogue of conditions of adequacy. In his 
1913 letter to Russell mentioned above, there is the 
requirement that an adequate logical notation has to 
provide means of proving the tautological character of 
logical truths in a uniform way (NB, 129). The theory of the 
bi-polarity of propositions also leads to the requirement 
that an adequate logical notation must be based on the 
idea that elementary sentences are true-or-false pictures 
of reality and, for this reason, logically independent from 
each other (TLP 2.021-2.0212). A further requirement is 
that logic has to be constructed in a way that accounts for 
the determinateness of sense (TLP 3.23), a requirement 
that leads to a form of semantic atomism. It may not be 
surprising that Wittgenstein, despite of his conventionalist 
attitude, was convinced that a logic constructed along the 
lines of his early philosophy is the only one that is able to 
meet all these criteria of adequacy (see NB, 17). 
 
3. Construction, Convention, and 
Subjectivity  
From this perspective, the seemingly anti-
conventionalist statements quoted by Ishiguro can be seen 
in a different light. It is interesting that one of these 
statements (TLP 5.61) is taken from Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of solipsism. The fact that “logic pervades the 
world” there is connected to the view that the world is “my 
world” and that “that language which alone I understand” is 
“my language” (TLP 5.62). Seen from this perspective, the 
facts that “my” world is in logical space (TLP 1.13) and that 
“my” language prevents illogical thought (TLP 5.4731) do 
not provide a convincing argument against a form of 
conventionalism restricted by a set of adequacy conditions. 
Quite to the contrary, aspects of Wittgenstein’s 
view of subjectivity can be seen as a consequence of his 
views about construction and convention. Subjectivity, for 
Wittgenstein, does not come in by way of a commitment to 
the phenomenological character of simple objects, or, 
correspondingly, to a phenomenological language (see 
Blank 2001). It is exactly the insight that it might prove 
impossible to identify any satisfactory examples of simple 
objects that introduces the theme of construction into 
Wittgenstein’s conception of ontology (see NB, 74). 
Rather, constructing logical rules and “archetype” of 
objects is subjective in the sense that it is something that 
we do. Thus, there are no de re necessities, no given 
structure of the world which, in turn, determines the 
structure of language. Language is “my” language, and the 
world “my” world, because both logic (which “pervades” 
language and the world) and the conception of simple 
objects (whose configurations constitute the world) are to 
be seen as results of construction. The only necessity at 
work here is a kind of necessity resulting from the set of 
adequacy conditions for a sufficient logical notation. 
This does not mean that the role of construction 
and convention would provide an exhaustive account of all 
Wittgenstein has to say about subjectivity. Quite to the 
contrary, some aspects of his remarks about solipsism 
cannot be explained without a consideration of the 
influence of authors such as Schopenhauer and Weininger 
(see, Sluga 1981; McGuinness 2001). This holds 
especially for some of the aspects of Wittgenstein’s view of 
subjectivity that are more closely tied to the issue of 
individuality, e.g. the issues of will, happiness and death 
(see TLP 6.43-6.4312). However, there also is a strongly, 
and explicitly, impersonal aspect in his conception of 
subjectivity. Consider, for example, the Notebook entry of 
23 May 1915, where Wittgenstein says: 
The limits of my language constitute the limits of 
my world. There is only one world soul, which I for 
preference call my soul and as which alone I conceive 
what I call the souls of others. (NB, 49)     
A few days later, in the entry of 29 May 1915, he 
cautiously, in the form of questions, puts forward the idea 
that, in some sense, there is only one language (NB, 52). 
The at the same time personal and impersonal character 
of subjectivity implied by this account of language can, at 
least in part, be explained by the role of construction and 
convention in Wittgenstein’s early views on logic and 
language. The personal aspect of subjectivity is, partly at 
least, due to the fact that each individual makes use of a 
language that is based on the construction of logical rules 
and ontological assumptions (and not on an independently 
given structure of the world). The impersonal character of 
subjectivity is due to the fact for all individuals the logical 
and ontological construction underlying language, due to 
the set of adequacy conditions, is the same. In this sense, 
in TLP 5.62 Wittgenstein characterizes “my” language at 
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